PRIMARIES BY PRECINCT: Your 3 Options
And how to design a contract for greater control over security measures in primary elections.
I will be quick about this, as I know that if you are reading this, you are ready for an immediate solution to at least some of the issues we have faced in trying to audit our elections in the past 6 years. Here are three options to consider for restoring a significant amount of security to your party’s next primary election:
Option 1 — Full ECHO Implementation (Recommended)
Hand-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.
Hand-Marked Ballot Counting: The ECHO Hand Count Method (countwithecho.org)
Hand-marked paper ballots.
Consecutively pre-numbered ballots (optional., but state law in Texas).
Ballots cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without ever being scanned.
Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.
Three-person counting teams. Batches of 50 Ballots in Large Counties (1M+ Population)
Hand count all hand-marked in-person ballots from early voting starting at 7am on Election Day along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots, sorted by precinct.
Hand count all hand—marked in-person ballots from Election Day at polling locations at lawful time outlined in state statute or after the close of polls, whichever allows counting to begin immediately.
Produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody.
Complete precinct returns before certification.
Number of counting teams per precinct is determined by speed of counting method, number of ballots and time allotted for precinct returns to be delivered for reporting.
Equipment Used is Already in Place
Electronic Poll Books
Paper Poll Books by precinct (if recently eliminated from your county/state procedures - bring them BACK)
Secure ballot boxes
Election kits (tally sheets, reconciliation forms, chain of custody forms, precinct returns)
No scanners required for this option begin securing elections.
Pros
Maximum auditability.
Preserves ballot secrecy by default.
Strongest chain of custody.
Lowest technology dependence.
Fully transparent public hand count.
Fast precinct-level recount capability.
Cons
Additional counting staff will be required.
2+hrs per 50 ballot batch per voting team could delay results reporting in counties with populations of 1M+.
Increased number of provisional ballots initially.
Option 2 — Hand Count the Machine-Marked Ballots (PVRs) Cast By Precinct (Quickest to Hand-Count)
Machine-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.
Machine-Marked Ballot Counting: The ECHO Hand Count Method (countwithecho.org)
Machine-Marked physical ballots (PVRs).
Consecutively pre-numbered ballots (optional., but state law in Texas).
Ballots cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without being scanned.
Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.
Three-person counting teams. Batches of 50 Ballots in Large Counties (1M+ Population)
Hand count all Printed Vote Records (PVRs) (Ballots) from early voting starting at 7am on Election Day, along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots, sorted by precinct.
Hand count all Election Day PVRs at polling location at lawful time outlined in state statute.
Produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody.
Complete precinct returns before certification.
Number of counting teams per precinct is determined by speed of counting method, number of ballots and time allotted for precinct returns to be delivered for reporting.
Equipment Used is Already in Place
Ballot Marking Devices
Electronic Poll Books
Paper Poll Books
Secure ballot boxes
Election kits
No tabulation scanners.
Pros
Minimal voter process changes.
Eliminates reliance on electronic tabulation.
Preserves precinct reporting.
Strengthens chain of custody.
Publicly auditable hand count.
Cons
Additional counting staff will be required.
1.5hrs per 50 ballot batch per voting team could delay results reporting in counties with populations of 1M+.
Increased number of provisional ballots initially.
Minimal reliance on voting system technology.
Option 3 — Ballots Cast By Precinct, Counted by Scanner (Simplest Method to Return to Voting By Precinct Immediately)
Machine-Marked, Machine-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.
Ballot Method
Ballot Marking Devices generate Printed Vote Records (PVRs).
Regular ballot PVRs cast by precinct into ballot box.
Provisional ballots remain assigned to their precinct, counted upon ID verification.
Counting Method
Scan ballots by precinct.
Produce separate precinct reports.
Maintain physical ballot records by precinct for audits and recounts.
Equipment Used is Already in Place
Ballot Marking Devices
Precinct optical scanners
Electronic Poll Books
Paper Poll Books
Secure ballot boxes
Election Kits
Pros
Minimal operational changes.
Restores precinct-level reporting.
Improves chain of custody over countywide mixing.
Faster election night reporting.
Allows meaningful audits using precinct-specific ballot batches.
Cons
Greatest reliance on voting system technology of the three options.
Scanner/tabulator use not ideal.
Common Features (All Options)
Precinct-assigned polling locations.
Countywide voting preserved through provisional ballots.
Electronic Poll Books used for voter check-in and ballot style assignment.
Paper Poll Books used to determine regular ballot eligibility.
Ballots maintained by precinct.
Public voter education campaign.
Online precinct lookup tool.
Compliance with federal paper trail and record retention requirements.
Compliance with State party primary election laws governing party authority, provisional voting, ballot secrecy, and precinct reporting.
Voter Check-In & Ballot Issuance
1. Regular Ballots
A voter receives a regular ballot when they:
Vote at their assigned polling location.
Present an acceptable photo ID (or otherwise satisfy Texas identification requirements).
Appear on the precinct paper poll book.
Regular ballots are cast and counted with that precinct’s election returns.
2. Provisional Ballots
A voter receives a provisional ballot if they:
Vote at a polling location other than their assigned location.
Are not listed on the precinct paper poll book.
Do not present acceptable photo identification.
Are otherwise required by law to vote provisionally.
Using the electronic poll books, election workers will issue the voter the correct ballot style regardless of where they vote.
Once the voter successfully verifies their eligibility and identity through the normal provisional ballot review process, the ballot is approved and counted in accordance with State law.
Voter Access
No eligible voter is denied the opportunity to vote.
Voters may cast a provisional ballot at any polling location.
Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style.
Paper poll books determine eligibility for a regular precinct ballot while preserving precinct-based election reporting.
General Implementation Considerations
Early Voting & Election Day
Apply the same precinct-based procedures during both Early Voting and Election Day.
Use identical voter check-in, ballot issuance, chain of custody, and reporting procedures throughout the voting period.
Preserve precinct-level ballot accounting from the time a ballot is cast until final certification.
Polling Location Assignments
Assign voters to polling locations nearest their registered residence.
Balance precinct assignments to create more uniform voter traffic across all polling locations.
Reduce dependence on oversized countywide vote centers serving disproportionately large numbers of voters.
Improve staffing efficiency by distributing expected turnout more evenly among locations.
Produce more consistent ballot volumes and hand-count workloads at each polling location.
Transition Period
Expect an initial increase in provisional ballots while voters become familiar with their assigned polling locations.
Voters may continue voting at any polling location using a provisional ballot per federal law.
Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style regardless of location.
Once voter eligibility and identity are verified under existing Texas provisional ballot procedures, eligible provisional ballots are approved and counted.
As voters transition to their assigned polling locations, provisional ballot usage is expected to decline.
TBTR.US Precinct Mapping
TBTR.US precinct-based voting maps are designed using each state’s and county’s existing election infrastructure.
Existing polling locations are retained whenever practical.
Existing election equipment, personnel, and facilities remain in use.
Precinct assignments are optimized to balance voter volume while preserving precinct-based reporting.
Security Benefits
Implementation of any of these three options immediately strengthens several fundamental election security measures by:
Producing auditable precinct returns, thereby trengthening chain of custody for precinct returns.
Restoring the ability to conduct affordable, speedy audits and recounts.
Increasing public confidence through verifiable, precinct-level election results.
Restoration of Ballot Secrecy, which eliminates the need for post-eleciton redaction of election records, guraanteeing full public access while protecting voter’s ballot selections from public scrutiny except from the voter themselves.
Below is my example proposal for the Tarrant County GOP and all other Texas Counties to help secure their upcoming primaries by restoring meaningful measures.
Introduction
The Tarrant GOP Leadership recognizes both the right and the duty to ensure auditable elections that protect the secrecy of each voter’s ballot and strengthen the chain of custody for precinct returns. This responsibility is most directly within the Party’s control during its own primary elections—where, in past cycles, numerous instances of obfuscated election anomalies have gone unresolved and certified without satisfactory explanation.
Under Texas law, county election administrators only have authority over the conduct of early voting during a primary election when a joint election agreement is in place between participating political parties—which Tarrant GOP Leadership will not be agreeing to. Accordingly, the Party retains the discretion to hand count its Printed Vote Records (PVRs) and to assign precincts to polling locations in a manner that facilitates accurate, auditable results. This decision does not compel the Democratic Party to hand count their records, nor does it restrict their use of electronic poll books or countywide access in their own primary elections.
Precincts may be strategically assigned to polling locations using certain criteria to balance efficiency and audit integrity. The federally mandated use of provisional ballots remains fully compatible with state-level laws governing countywide access and early voting and on election day, ensuring that no voter is turned away or receives the wrong ballot style. Neither the laws governing countywide access during early voting nor those on Election Day guarantee any voter a “regular” (non-provisional) ballot, since eligibility determination depends on each voter’s individual circumstances at the time they request a ballot, which the law cannot anticipate in advance. Reliance on a hard-copy paper poll book will allow Tarrant GOP to track the number of expected voters casting regular ballots by precinct.
Lawful voters who wish to participate in the party’s primary, but who do not wish to vote at their assigned precinct polling location, will receive the proper ballot style and may vote at any location, though their ballot will not be counted with the precinct returns for that location. Instead, their ballot is considered provisional and will be sent to our own Tarrant GOP ballot board for processing. The Tarrant GOP Leadership recognizes that, under our current system, not every voter will be afforded ballot secrecy if some choose to vote outside of their precinct. However, it is also true that the Tarrant GOP Leadership is the only entity in Tarrant County providing an option for voters that will afford auditability, ballot secrecy and an improved chain of custody for precinct returns.
Importantly, early voting must mirror Election Day procedures to preserve ballot secrecy, auditability, and a robust chain of custody for all precinct returns.
Through these measures, the Tarrant County Republican Party reaffirms its commitment to state and federal laws ordering the creation and preservation of an auditable paper trail, the inherent necessity of any election system to guarantee voters the right to a secret ballot by default, and to allow the unredacted examination of records along with a strong chain of custody for precinct returns to restore trust in our upcoming primary election results.
Contract
The contract and operational procedures for the upcoming Tarrant County Republican Primary will remain standard up to the point of scanner allocation. At that stage, ballot boxes will be delivered and secured without the HART scanners attached, ensuring the integrity of the physical ballot chain of custody. Electronic poll books (e-poll books) will continue to be used for voter check-in, to alert the county regarding provisional voters, and to generate all voter’s proper ballot style. However, paper poll books—ordered and organized by precinct—will be used to determine which voters receive a regular ballot to be counted with that location’s in-person returns, and which will have their vote counted provisionally.
To facilitate voter participation and transparency, the Tarrant County Republican Party will deploy an online link where voters can find their assigned polling locations, also to be added to the Tarrant County Elecitons website. A public education campaign should accompany this rollout to encourage informed participation and to ensure that voters understand the process and its purpose: achieving a hand-counted precinct-level report, which is both auditable and guarantees ballot secrecy while strengthening the chain of custody by casting all precinct ballots together.
Aside from these specific procedural adjustments, additional counting staff of around or under 1k for election day only to count all ballots and deliver returns by 1am ideally, other general operations will remain largely unchanged. Voters’ experiences will be nearly identical to current operations—with the notable exception of the absence of attached scanners at the ballot boxes, and an uptick in provisional ballots, which is inevitable regardless of when or how we return to voting by precint.
The Tarrant County GOP will require approximately 588-1005 temporary workers dedicated to counting both the early voting ballots and election day ballots, along with a predetermined number of election kits to support the hand-counting process at each polling location. These election kits will include tally sheets, batch reporting forms, precinct return documentation, chain of custody forms, and other materials required under state law. Each kit will also contain the poll books for all precincts assigned to that location. Half of the county’s ballot boxes are required by the party, distributed evenly between the two participating parties. This number should equate to approximately 300, possibly more.
Finally, the Tarrant County Republican Party requires to the use of available spaces within the Tarrant County Elections facilities between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. on Election Day for the hand counting of early-voted ballots, as well as adjacent rooms to each election day polling location capable of accommodating a three-person counting team to complete the process securely and efficiently. Ideally in all Early Voting locations these will be the same rooms used for election equipment storage during early voting, and similar accommodations for Election Day polling locations would be ideal for hand-counting Election Day ballots.
Contract Items Needed from County:
- All Early Voting and Election Day Polling Locations, along with side rooms used during Early Voting for storage of voting equipment.
- Typical Number of ePoll Books, Controllers, BMDs for the number of polling locations.
- Typical number of consecutively pre-numbered ballots per location.
- 300 Ballot Boxes used between Early Voting and Election Day.
- 699 Paper Poll Books on Carbon Paper for expected In-person and absentee voters. (or one for each precinct)
Citations:
1. Election Administrator’s Authority in Primary Elections: [Chapter 172]
a. Accept Filings for Office from Party Chair [172.029]
b. Maintain County Elections Website [172.055]
c. Produce Miscellaneous Ballots for Chair [172.090]
d. Post Notice of Election and Combined Precincts [172.1112]
e. Produce pre-election List of Registered Precinct Voters and post-election Turnout File for Chair [172.1141]
f. Submit Canvass Report to SOS [172.116]
g. Enter Primary Results to County Database [172.123]
h. Prepare Precinct Results and Report to SOS [172.124]
i. Supervise Overall Conduct of Election Exclusively Under the Agreement to a Joint Primary [172.126]
j. Contract with State Chair in the Absence of a County Chair [172.128]
k. Serve as Early Voting Clerk with the same authority as an Election Day Judge at a regular polling location [83.001, 83.002]
2. Party Rights in State Law:
a. Overall Authority over Primary Elections [172.111]
(Authority lies with the party executive committee to oversee the conduct, no exception for early voting)
b. Right of Chair to negotiate Contract for Primary [31.093]
(Sections c, d, e, outline the requirements of the County Elections Clerk)
(No exceptions made for the supervision of the conduct of primary during Early Voting in the contract)
(No mention of necessity to bind both parties to the same methods in their primaries)
3. Countywide Access Laws:
a. Early Voting Countywide Access [85.066]
(Does not/cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)
(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)
a. Election Day (Countywide Polling Place Program) [43.007]
(Does not/ cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)
(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)
4. Ballot Secrecy:
a. Ballot Secrecy is outlined as part of the Legislative Intent for the entire election code [1.0015] and applies to all elections in Texas [1.002]
b. Ballot Secrecy is mandated for all voting systems used in Texas Elections [122.001]
c. Ballot Secrecy Violations Acknowledged in HART and ES&S Voting Systems; Redactions Ordered by SOS [Election Advisory 2024-20]
(Redaction destroys auditability and public access to election records to cover up an inherent violation of ballot secrecy. Public access is not the issue, the lack of a guarantee of ballot secrecy is the issue. Redaction is not the solution)
(Casting all ballots of a precinct together is the only remedy, and it must be administered where possible)
5. Federal Laws:
a. Auditability [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]
(Auditable Paper Trail Mandated)
b. Preservation of Records [52USC §20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation]
(Records Preserved for Examination for minimum of 22 months)
c. Paper Record is Official Record [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]
(Paper Records are Official Records for Elections)
a. Use of Provisional Ballots [52USC §21082. Provisional voting and voting information requirements]
(For Voters Not on Precinct Qualified Voter List Who Are Registered OR Who Cannot Be Properly Identified)
6. State Hand Count Laws:
a. Chapter 65
(Counting Procedures which ECHO follows)
b. Chapter 66
(Reporting Procedures which ECHO follows)
7. Combination of Precinct Polling Location Laws:
a. Combining Precincts in Primary [42.0051]
(Requires adherence to 42.005 for combination of precincts based on ballot style)
b. Consolidating Precincts in Primary [42.009]
(No reference to other code, simply allows parties to consolidate precincts into adequate polling locations as necessary to accommodate all voters)
(TBTR Strategies recommends simply consolidating precincts into existing polling locations and not necessarily combining precincts with identical ballot styles)
8. Texas Constitution Article 6, Section 2
(c) The privilege of free suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.
Adherence to federal mandates is non-negotiable, and all state laws must be designed in such a way that honors and upholds both Federal Law and the State Constitution
Citations: Texas Election Code as an EXAMPLE
1. Countywide Access Laws:
a. Early Voting Countywide Access [85.066]
(Does not/cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)
(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)
b. Election Day (Countywide Polling Place Program) [43.007]
(Does not/ cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)
(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)
2. Ballot Secrecy:
a. Ballot Secrecy is outlined as part of the Legislative Intent for the entire election code [1.0015] and applies to all elections in Texas [1.002]
b. Ballot Secrecy is mandated for all voting systems used in Texas Elections [122.001]
c. Ballot Secrecy Violations Acknowledged in HART and ES&S Voting Systems; Redactions Ordered by SOS [Election Advisory 2024-20]
(Redaction destroys auditability and public access to election records to cover up an inherent violation of ballot secrecy. Public access is not the issue, the lack of a guarantee of ballot secrecy is the issue. Redaction is not the solution)
(Casting all ballots of a precinct together is the only remedy, and it must be administered where possible)
3. Federal Laws:
a. Auditability [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]
(Auditable Paper Trail Mandated)
b. Preservation of Records [52USC §20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation]
(Records Preserved for Examination for minimum of 22 months)
c. Paper Record is Official Record [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]
(Paper Records are Official Records for Elections)
d. Use of Provisional Ballots [52USC §21082. Provisional voting and voting information requirements]
(For Voters Not on Precinct Qualified Voter List Who Are Registered OR Who Cannot Be Properly Identified)
All Rights Reserved
Hand-Count Strategy by Precinct for Tarrant County GOP Primary ‘26
Aubree
TBTR Strategies
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