My name is Aubree. I am the founder of TBTR Strategies, formerly Taking Back Texas, and an election integrity researcher based in Tarrant County, Texas.
Since 2021, I have conducted extensive firsthand investigations into Texas election administration in my own county and across the nation, documenting procedural changes over multiple election cycles. To the best of my knowledge, I am the only election observer to have systematically documented these changes in such detail.
My findings revealed a common pattern: the erosion of three foundational principles of election security—Auditable Paper Trails, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody.
My work now focuses on practical, low-cost solutions that restore these safeguards immediately using existing election infrastructure. I have endorsed the ECHO Hand Count Method for any county ready to make the shift away from electronic tabulation of cast ballots.
TBTR.US demonstrates, with experience and first-hand knowledge, how today’s election systems have become unnecessarily expensive, technologically complex, and increasingly dependent on proprietary vendors while often weakening ballot secrecy, chain of custody, auditability, and voter civil rights.
The solution is not more redactions and more technology that also cannot be audited by average Americans. The solution is returning to transparent, lawful election administration that the public can easily participate in, understand, observe and verify.
At the center of this work are The ABCs of Election Security:
A — Auditable Paper Trails: Every vote should produce a paper record that can be independently audited without redaction.
B — Ballot Secrecy: Only the voter should know which ballot is theirs.
C — Chain of Custody: Every ballot must remain continuously accounted for from issuance through certification.
Everything else follows from these three principles.
The Problem: Redacted Records, Countywide Voting and the Loss of Precinct Accountability = No Auditable Paper Trail
We can no longer audit our elections. Redactions, denials and missing records make it impossible to truly know who won an election conducted with modern US procedures and computerized systems.
For generations, elections were administered by precinct. Every voter reported to an assigned precinct. Ballots were issued, cast, secured, counted and reported within that precinct before becoming part of the countywide report.
The precinct became the smallest auditable unit of an election—the most minute political subdivision available for public review of its election returns. It is also state law to report these results.
This structure naturally preserved ballot secrecy while giving election officials a clear method of reconciliation. Officials could compare voter check-ins, ballots issued, ballots cast, spoiled ballots, provisional ballots and ballots counted without identifying how any individual voted.
The modern practice of allowing regular, non-provisional ballots at countywide vote centers has created significant challenges to all three principles. Countywide vote centers have eliminated the last voting option that inherently guaranteed ballot secrecy—in-precinct voting on Election Day.
Casting all ballots by precinct restores auditability by guaranteeing ballot secrecy and eliminating the need for post-election redaction. It strengthens chain of custody for precinct-level returns by having the evidence of those returns ready and available to be examined without redaction.
Ballot Secrecy
Ballot Secrecy is one of the oldest and most fundamental principles of American elections. It assures that once a voter lawfully casts a ballot, no one can later determine how that individual voted. This protects every citizen from intimidation, coercion, retaliation or influence.
Election transparency and ballot secrecy are not opposing principles. They are complementary safeguards.
Casting regular ballots countywide destroys ballot secrecy as outlined in several of my reports. Susan Valiant, TX, first discovered this issue while investigating the mysterious voting trend shift in Tarrant County, Texas after the 2020 Election. She discovered that any voter who is the only voter from their precinct, or a husband and wife duo, to vote at a countywide vote center will have their ballot and ballot selections immediately identified.
I do not believe this audience needs explaining the danger of seeing a voters’ choices. Our legislatures also understand this danger, hence why ALL 50 STATES have ballot secrecy requirements per Federal law.
Requiring post-election redaction of public election records inherently destroys meaningful auditability of election records and leaves no readily available physical evidence of precinct returns that are reported out. This is why our states’ election officials redacted a variety of election records. They have allowed the practice to expand, though they knew all this.
The election process should be transparent, observable and verifiable from beginning to end. It is the identifiable selections of the voter—not the administration of the election—that must remain confidential.
Ballot secrecy is best preserved when ballots are issued and cast by precinct. It can be enhanced through sequentially numbered ballots presented face down for random voter selection, as is currently done in Texas. Only the voter knows the identifying number of the ballot they selected.
When elections are designed to preserve voter anonymity from the beginning, more election records can be released without extensive review or redaction. Privacy should be built into the process so that transparency will be built into the record. It’s actually the Law already.
An Auditable Paper Trail preserves the physical evidence of voter intent. Ballot Secrecy ensures that evidence cannot be connected to the identity of the voter. Chain of Custody documents where that evidence has been from the moment ballots are issued until the election is certified and retained.
Together, these principles strengthen one another.
Chain of Custody: The Missing Link
Chain of Custody is the documented history of an item from the moment it is created until it is archived, destroyed or presented as evidence.
It records who had possession, when they possessed it, where it was stored, how it was transported and who received it next.
Elections are evidence-based processes.
Every ballot cast is evidence of voter intent. Ballot boxes, ballot bags, poll books, memory devices, tally sheets, batch reports, registration files and precinct returns become part of the evidentiary record supporting the final election result.
Just as a prosecutor must prove where evidence has been from the crime scene to the courtroom, election officials should be able to demonstrate where ballots have been from issuance to final certification.
The public should be able to ask:
Where were the ballots stored?
Who transported them?
Who had access to them?
When did custody transfer occur?
Were seals intact?
Do ballot counts reconcile with voter check-ins and precinct returns?
These are normal questions for any process that relies upon public trust.
Most election workers are dedicated public servants who perform their duties professionally and honestly. Strong chain of custody procedures protect them as much as they protect the election itself. Proper documentation removes doubt, answers questions and provides objective evidence that procedures were followed correctly.
In the absence of documented chain of custody, citizens are asked to trust the process. In the presence of chain of custody, citizens can verify the process.
Trust is important, but verification is vital.
The Turn-Key Solution: Paper Elections - By Precinct
The answer does not require immediately replacing existing voting equipment or reducing voter access. Though the goal is to eliminate the use of machines, it must first be demonstrated that these issues described above are inherent to moder voting systems and their associated practices. Following that, a solution must be provided to ensure a more lawful - yet feasible and affordable - option for consideration.
We have not yet, and will not, see success without proving 1.) these issues came in with the voting systems, and that 2.) we do not need these voting systems to conduct a modern election.
This is an incrimental approach to immediately undermine these modern practices and systems which have so thoroughly destroyed our auditable paper trails, ballot secrecy protections, and chain of custody for the actual ballots, along with our trust in US elections.
I have a proposal. The proposal is simple:
Use existing polling locations and immediately return to precinct-based elections.
Assign voters to nearby precinct locations to restore ballot secrecy. Reinforce chain of custody for precinct returns to simplify audits and recounts. Guarantee full post-election auditability without excessive redaction of ballots that should be anonymous by design.
To do this, your county will need to:
Print a hard-copy paper poll book immediately after each voter registration deadline for each precinct and deliver it to the assigned Early Voting and Election Day locations.
Use the hard-copy paper poll book as the official record for regular, non-provisional voting. Only voters listed in the paper precinct voter book who provide proper identification may cast a regular ballot. Everyone else votes provisionally. Provisional ballots are sorted and verified by precinct, then counted upon verification by precinct. Same with Mail-In Ballots - and GOD BLESS PRESIDENT TRUMP FOR THAT E.O. ON USPS HANDLING OF MAIL BALLOTS. ITS AMAZING.
Back to the proposal.
Electronic Poll Books should be limited to administrative functions: assigning the proper ballot style, recording voter check-in and producing provisional ballots through ballot-on-demand functionality. They do not replace the official paper precinct voter record. They are not what determines who gets a regular ballot. They are no longer relied upon for voter access to ballots. YAY!
This does not totally eliminate countywide voter access, though, and let me explain this crucial point for voter access.
A voter at their assigned polling location receives a regular ballot. A voter at another location receives a provisional ballot containing the proper ballot style associated with their home precinct.
Though many states have laws and rules that authorize the casting of regular ballots countywide, under the guise of expanding voter access, not one single state has a law that guarantees voters a regular, non-provisional ballot at each location. They cannot do that, as it would eliminate the need for all other eligibility criteria for voting. They are not quite there yet, though we see the very groups pushing these modern systems pushing the elimination of precinct voting and provisinal ballot use.
You can still vote at any location. A regular ballot at your precinct’s assigned location, and a provisional ballot everywhere else or if you have no ID.
Provisional ballots already exist to ensure eligible voters are not denied access. Once approved, they can be sorted into their proper precinct before counting.
Thus, countywide voter access and precinct accountability can coexist.
No eligible voter is denied the opportunity to vote. YAY!
Three Turn-Key Options
There are three nationally applicable, turn-key proposals for restoring a significant amount of security to the next election cycle. This is meant to be run during Early Voting as well as Election Day.
Option 1 — Full Paper Ballot + ECHO Hand Count
Use hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots cast by precinct, with paper poll books determining eligibility and ballot assignment.
Print and deliver a hard-copy paper poll book after the registration deadline.
Print the predetermined number of hand-marked paper ballots.
Consecutively pre-number ballots as an optional security feature, and as required by Texas law.
Use the paper poll book for official voter check-ins and regular ballot access.
Electronic poll books only for check-ins of provisional ballot voters.
Cast ballots by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without scanning.
Keep ballots grouped by precinct throughout the election.
Three-person counting teams count batches of 50, or less in large counties with 1M+ population.
Teams begin counting Early Voting ballots at 7 a.m. on Election Day, along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots sorted by precinct. Election Day ballots are counted at the lawful time, on location where they were cast, as outlined in state statute or after polls close, whichever allows counting to begin sooner.
Hand-Counting hand-marked ballots takes an average of 2.5hrs per batch of 50. Under and Over Votes are present, the latter requiring adjudication. The faster you can count, the fewer counting teams needed to count all ballots in the time allotted.
The result being that lead election clerks produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody, easily available for recounts and audits.
Reconciliation teams complete hand-tabulation of precinct returns for larger cumulative reports that can be broken down by precinct and verified in a TRUE canvass before certification.
The result is maximum auditability, ballot secrecy by default, the strongest chain of custody, the lowest technology dependence, a transparent public hand count and fast precinct-level recount capability. YAY!
Option 2 — Hand Count the Machine-Marked Ballots
Use existing polling locations, ballot marking devices, electronic poll books, paper poll books, secure ballot boxes and election kits while eliminating reliance on electronic tabulation.
Voters use the ballot marking device, approve their selections and confirm accuracy. The ballot is cast by precinct into an assigned ballot box without being scanned.
The ballots remain grouped by precinct.
Three-person teams hand count batches of 50, or less in large counties with 1M+ population.
Hand-Counting machine-marked ballots takes an average of 1.5hrs per batch of 50. The time saved is due to Over votes being eliminated as you cannot select more than one candidate on a ballot marking device. The faster you can count, the fewer counting teams needed to count all ballots in the time allotted.
This provides minimal worker/ voter process changes, eliminates reliance on electronic tabulation, preserves precinct reporting, strengthens chain of custody and provides a publicly auditable hand count.
The result is maximum auditability, ballot secrecy by default, the strongest chain of custody, the second-lowest technology dependence, a transparent public hand count and fast precinct-level recount capability. YAY!
Option 3 — Ballots Cast by Precinct, Counted by Scanner
Machine-marked, machine-counted paper ballots cast by precinct.
If the only thing you can do is cast ballots by precinct - do it immediately.
This is the simplest method to return to voting by precinct immediately and is the last-resort option.
Use existing polling locations, ballot marking devices, scanners, electronic poll books, paper poll books, secure ballot boxes and election kits as currently used, with a few minor changes.
Print the hard-copy paper poll book after the registration deadline. Use it to determine eligibility for a regular ballot. Use electronic poll books only for administrative functions and provisional ballots.
Cast and scan ballots by precinct. Produce separate precinct reports. Maintain physical ballot records by precinct for audits and recounts.
Reconciliation teams complete precinct returns for larger cumulative reports and verify them in a TRUE canvass before certification.
The result is NOT maximum auditability, but offeres ballot secrecy by default, eliminating the need for post-election redactions, a stronger chain of custody than currently afforded for precinct returns and fast precinct-level recount capability. Yay. Better than current practices by a long shot!
The Common Features
All three options share the same basic framework:
Precinct-assigned polling locations.
Countywide voting preserved through provisional ballots.
Electronic Poll Books used for voter check-in and ballot-style assignment.
Paper Poll Books used to determine regular ballot eligibility.
Ballots maintained by precinct.
Compliance with federal paper trail and record retention requirements.
Compliance with state party primary election laws governing party authority, provisional voting, ballot secrecy and precinct reporting.
Identical precinct-based procedures for Early Voting and Election Day.
Precinct-level ballot accounting from the time a ballot is cast until final certification.
Polling locations closer to voters’ homes.
Shorter lines for voters compared to countywide vote centers.
Benefits include the use of existing polling locations in most states and counties, though it may require a county to obtain a few more polling locations, or extra ballot boxes sortedby precicnt to cast voted ballots into. Precinct assignments are optimized to balance voter volume while preserving precinct-based reporting.
Expected turnout can be distributed more evenly among locations, improving staffing efficiency and creating more consistent ballot volumes and hand-count workloads.
The transition may initially increase provisional ballots while voters become familiar with their assigned polling locations again. Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style regardless of location. As voters transition to assigned polling locations, provisional ballot usage is expected to decline, as is our reliance on electronic poll books. YAY!
The ECHO Hand Count Method
TBTR Strategies has proposed an incremental yet meaningful switch away from dependence on computerized systems to give us our test results and into a precinct-based hand-counted election in a county the size of Tarrant County, Texas.
The faster a team can count a batch of ballots, the fewer teams are needed to count all ballots in the time allotted.
Counting PVRs (Printed Vote Records - Machine Marked Ballots) cuts about an hour from previous records for counting hand-marked ballots. The lack of overvotes on PVR ballots saves time, and the ECHO Hand Count Method is vital to reaching warp speed. There are a few other procedures I have heard are just as fast, accurate and organized and I would love to, one day, host an event where the best of the best can be compared and speed-tested.
A demonstration counted 34 races on 50 PVR ballots in under 1 hour and 30 minutes.
The speedy process is possible using the ECHO Hand Count Method. This is my recommended course for most counties who are struggling to convince their leadership to toss the machines entirely.
The objective is not to create an unnecessarily burdensome election system. It is to create an accurate, organized, speedy and easily auditable counting process that can work in large counties with more than 1M population and is even simpler in smaller counties.
Restoring Auditability, Ballot Secrecy and Chain of Custody
Returning to precinct-based voting for both Early Voting and Election Day restores ballot secrecy by ensuring that voters retain the option of voting within their assigned precinct, while provisional voters also enjoy this privacy guarantee.
Restoring ballot secrecy strengthens auditability and chain of custody because election records can be examined without redactions and reconciled without risking a connection between voters and their ballots.
Approved provisional ballots sorted by precinct before counting ensure every ballot is ultimately counted and reported within the voter’s proper precinct.
When ballots associated with a precinct are physically maintained and reported together, officials can review, audit and recount them without first attempting to locate ballots cast by voters from that precinct at multiple countywide voting locations through electronic records.
Physical precinct ballot groupings provide a clearer chain of custody, reduce administrative complexity and allow officials to focus directly on the ballots being reviewed.
This reduces the time, labor and expense required for audits and recounts while improving confidence in the results.
The Practical Result
Returning to precinct-based voting is a simple, cost-effective reform that can be implemented using existing voting technology.
It preserves countywide voter access.
It guarantees voters receive the correct ballot style.
It restores ballot secrecy.
It strengthens auditability and chain of custody.
It simplifies audits and recounts.
It improves public confidence in election outcomes.
Most importantly, it uses procedures and safeguards that already exist within current election law and election administration practices.
The solution is not more technology. The solution is not more redactions.
The solution is transparent, lawful election administration that the public can easily participate in, understand, observe and verify.
Election integrity should never depend upon blind trust. It should depend upon procedures that produce verifiable evidence while protecting every lawful voter.
The public should be able to observe election procedures, reconcile election records, audit paper ballots, review chain of custody documentation and verify election results without compromising the privacy of a single citizen.
That is the purpose of the ABCs of Election Security.
Auditability. Ballot Secrecy. Chain of Custody.
Election integrity begins with evidence.
Evidence begins with voting by precinct and ends with a solid, complete, accurate and unbroken chain of custody.
If you appreciate this work, we accept donations - though they are NOT required for access to this vital information.
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All donation amounts help. Thank you, patriots.
Aubree
Founder, TBTR.US
Election Security Subject Matter Expert
Subject Matter Expert: Poll Watching, Auditing Election Returns, Recounts, Hand Counting Strategy, Practical Application of Voting Systems, Hand Counting Strategy for Large Counties, etc.
Again, well-done, Aubree.
Good job Aubree! Two questions: all the provisional ballots generated- if they go to central count, we have the problem with chain of custody as much as ever unless I missed something. Secondly, what would it take to return to the counting methods prior to 2019? I wasn’t here but I understand that we had precinct voting but I don’t know how counting worked. Thank you for all your hard work!